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ABSTRACT. A decision maker observes the evolving state of the world
while constantly trying to predict the next state given the history of past
states. The ability to benefit from such predictions depends not only on
the ability to recognize patters in history, but also on the range of actions
available to the decision maker.
We assume there are two possible states of the world. The decision
maker is a gambler who has to bet a certain amount of money on the
bits of an announced binary sequence of states. If he makes a correct
prediction he wins his wager, otherwise he loses it.
We compare the power of betting strategies (aka martingales) whose
wagers take values in different sets of reals. A martingale whose wa-
gers take values in a set A is called an A-martingale. A set of reals B
anticipates a set A, if for every A-martingale there is a countable set
of B-martingales, such that on every binary sequence on which the A-
martingale gains an infinite amount at least one of the B-martingales
gains an infinite amount, too.
We show that for two important classes of pairs of sets A and B, B
anticipates A if and only if the closure of B contains rA, for some pos-
itive r. One class is when A is bounded and B is bounded away from
zero; the other class is whenB is well ordered (has no left-accumulation
points). Our results generalize several recent results in algorithmic ran-
domness and answer a question posed by Chalcraft et al. (2012).
E-mail addresses: gilbav@math.huji.ac.il, ronprtz@gmail.com.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Randomness and computation are related to two basic elements of boun-
ded rationality modeling: (a) players cannot generate truly random actions;
(b) they cannot implement arbitrarily complex strategies. When rationality
is computationally constrained, true randomness can be replaced by pseudo-
randomness: one need not generate truly random actions, just actions whose
pattern is too complicated for any rationally bounded agent to be able to
recognize.
Algorithmic randomness is the field of computer science that studies the
relations between computability and randomness. It provides the rigorous
definitions and analytic tools to address questions involving the tension be-
tween the two above elements of bounded rationality. On the other hand,
the present paper applies game theory to solve a problem from algorithmic
randomness by recasting the problem as an extensive form game.
1.1. Gambling house game. Gambler 0, the cousin of the casino owner,
repeatedly bets on red/black. She is only allowed to wager even (positive)
integers, i.e., she can bet 4 dollars on black, then 10 on red, then 2 on black,
etc. (“betting 4 on black” means that you gain 4 if black occurred, and lose
4 if red did). Then the regular gamblers make their bets, and they are only
allowed to wager odd integers. The red/black outcome is not decided by a
lottery; rather, the casino owner chooses red or black. He attempts to aid
gambler 0 by his choices.1
All gamblers start with some finite, not necessary equal, wealth. Going
into debt is not allowed, i.e., you cannot bet more than you have. Say that a
gambler “succeeds” if, along the infinite stream of bets, her wealth tends to
infinity. The “home team”, consisting of the casino owner and gambler 0,
wins if and only if gambler 0 succeeds while the other gamblers do not.
In the case depicted above, gambler 0 uses even integers as wagers, and
the others use odd wagers. We will see that the home team can guarantee
a win in this case and that they could not had it been the other way round,
namely, odd integers for gambler 0 and even integers for the others. In
general, let A be the wagers allowed to gambler 0, and B those allowed
1Following the standard algorithmic randomness formalism, it is assumed that the gam-
blers do not observe each other’s bets or gains, but only observe the casino sequence of
reds and blacks. This assumption turns out to be immaterial for our results.
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to the other gamblers (A,B being any pair of subsets of the positive real
numbers). We ask for which A and B the home team can guarantee a win,
in the following sense: gambler 0 can choose a strategy that guarantees that
for any strategies that the other gamblers choose the casino can choose a
sequence so that the home team wins.
As a simple example, suppose that apart from gambler 0 there is only
one more, regular, gambler (call him gambler 1), and first, let A = {2}
and B = {1}. Then the home team cannot guarantee a win: for any pure
strategy of gambler 0, let gambler 1 employ the strategy that is a copy of
it, only wagering 1 instead of 2. Then the gains (or losses) of 1 are exactly
half the gains of 0. Therefore, if gambler 0 succeeds, so does gambler 1.
Second, let B be as before, and let A = {1, 2}. Then the home team can
guarantee a win as follows. The strategy of gambler 0 is simple: she always
bets on red; at the start she wagers two dollars, and keeps doing this as long
as she wins. Then, after the first loss, she switches to wagering one dollar
ad infinitum. The casino strategy chooses, in a first phase, red every time,
until the wealth of 0 exceeds 1’s wealth by more than three dollars (note
that this is bound to eventually happen, since in the first phase 0 gains two
every time, while 1 gains at most one). Then it chooses black once (after
which the wealth of 0 still exceeds the wealth of 1, as 0 lost two dollars and
1 gained no more than one dollar). Then comes the second phase, where
the casino always chooses the opposite color to what gambler 1 bet on, and
chooses red if 1 did not bet anything. This strategy of the casino ensures
that, during the second phase, 1 cannot make a non-zero bet more than a
finite number of times before he goes broke (and if 1 does go broke, 0 still
does not). Hence, whatever strategy he chooses, 1 will not succeed, while 0
will.
1.2. Computability, randomness and unpredictability. This casino game
is related to the notions of randomness and computability. In the theory
of algorithmic randomness, a sequence of zeros and ones is called com-
putably random if there exists no computable strategy that succeeds against
it (thus, the sequence is in some sense unpredictable). For a set A of pos-
itive real numbers, a sequence is A-valued random if there exists no com-
putable gambling strategy (aka “martingale”), with wagers in A, that suc-
ceeds against it. Hence we may compare two sets of reals A and B, and
ask whether B-valued randomness implies A-valued randomness. In other
words, whether for any casino sequence x, and a computable A-martingale
(gambling strategy with wagers in A) that succeeds on x, there exists a B-
martingale that succeeds on x. And in terms of our casino game, suppose
that every computable B-martingale is employed by some regular gambler.
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Then the question is whether there exist a computable A-martingale and a
casino sequence, such that the home team wins.
There are countably many computable strategies. In many cases this
countability, rather than the specific type of admissible strategies, is the
essential point in the analysis. This naturally leads to the following setting
(Definition 2): gambler 0’s wagers are in A, and there are countably many
regular players, whose wagers are in B. We will say that A evades B if
the home team can guarantee a win. This is the central notion in our paper.
Thus, we are not directly concerned with computability, or other complexity
considerations2, but rather take a more abstract view: we only require that
the number of strategies against which the home team needs to concurrently
combat is countable (See also Remark 1 below). One may consider a few
variants of this settings (see below).
If A does not evade B, we say that B anticipatesA. If B contains A, then
clearly B anticipates A, because the strategy of gambler 1 can be an exact
copy of 0’s strategy (and there is even no need for countably many regular
gamblers, one is enough). Therefore, if 0 succeeds, so does 1. Similarly, if
B contains a multiple of A, i.e., B ⊇ rA for some r > 0, then B anticipates
A: as in the example above, theB-strategy can be the same as theA-strategy
up to the multiple r (i.e., the wagers are multiplied by r), and therefore
the gains are the same, multiplied by r. For example, the even integers
anticipate the odd integers (or the whole set of integers, for that matter).
Thus, B containing a multiple of A is a sufficient condition for B to an-
ticipate A. Is it also a necessary condition? Chalcraft et al. (2012) showed
that if A and B are finite, then it is necessary. They asked whether this char-
acterization extends to infinite A and B (note that their framework is that
of algorithmic randomness, i.e., it only allows for computable martingales).
In other words:
(∗) Does B not containing a multiple of A imply that A evades B?
1.3. Our contribution. Theorem 8 implies a negative answer to this ques-
tion.3 Thus, for example, the segment [0, 1] anticipates the set R+, although
it does not contain any multiple of it. Still, although (∗) does not hold in
general, we will see classes of pairs A,B where (∗) does hold. Theorem 6
says that if A is bounded, and B \ {0} is bounded away from 0, then (∗)
2Rod Downey (private communication) pointed out that in the case where A and B
are recursive sets of rational numbers our analysis applies to the question whether every
B-valued random is A-valued random.
3We restrict our attention to closed sets, since every set anticipates its closure
(Lemma 3).
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holds. Thus, for example, the set {1, π} evades the positive integers. Theo-
rem 7 says that if B is well-ordered, then (∗) holds. Thus, for example, the
set of even integers evades the odds.
Now let us consider the following version of our casino game, whose
description is more like that of a “classic” repeated game. At each stage
of the repeated game, first gambler 0 makes a bet; then, after observing it,
the (team of) regular gamblers each make their bets; and then the casino
chooses a red/black outcome. All of our results apply to this version as
well.
The difference between our definition of evasion and the description of
this game is that in the former setting, the regular gamblers knew the strat-
egy of gambler 0 (i.e., including her future actions), gambler 0 did not ob-
serve their past actions, and the casino knew the strategies of all gamblers.
One may consider many such variations to the settings, and our results are
robust to all of them – whether gambler 0 observes anything or not, whether
the regular gamblers know her future bets or not, and whether the casino
knows the future bets or not.
Previous work on martingales with restricted wagers (Bienvenu et al. (2012),
Teutsch (2013), Peretz (2013)) employed various solutions in various spe-
cific situations. The present paper proposes a systematic treatment that ap-
plies to most of the previously studied situations, as well as many others.
Our proofs are elementary and constructive. Also, the proposed construc-
tion is recursive: it does not rely on what the strategies do in the future;
therefore we believe our method can be useful in many frameworks where
computational or other constraints are present.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
definitions, results, and a few examples, as well as a discussion of related
previous work. The next two sections contain proofs. Section 5 points to
open problems and further directions.
2. DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
A martingale is a gambling strategy that bets on bits of a binary sequence.
Formally, it is a function M : {h, t}∗ → R that satisfies
M(σ) =
M(σh) +M(σt)
2
,
for every string σ ∈ {h, t}∗.
The increment of M at σ ∈ {h, t}∗ is defined as
M ′(σ) = M(σh)−M(σ).
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For A ⊂ R+, we say that M is an A-martingale if |M ′(σ)| ∈ A, for
every σ ∈ {h, t}∗.
The empty string is denoted ε and M(ε) is called the initial value of M .
Note that a martingale is determined by its initial value and its increments.
The initial sub-string of length n of a binary sequence, X ∈ {h, t}∞,
is denoted X ↾ n. A martingale M succeeds on X , if limn→∞M(X ↾
n) = ∞ and M(X ↾ n) ≥ |M ′(X ↾ n)|, for every n. The latter condition
asserts that M doesn’t bet on money it doesn’t have. The set of sequences
on which M succeeds is denoted succ(M). A martingale N dominates
M if succ(N) ⊇ succ(M), and a set of martingales N dominates M if⋃
N∈N succ(N) ⊇ succ(M).
The following are non-standard definitions.
Definition 1. A set B ⊆ R+ singly anticipates a set A ⊆ R+, if every A-
martingale is dominated by some B-martingale. If A singly anticipates B
and B singly anticipates A, we say that A and B are strongly equivalent.
Definition 2. A set B ⊆ R+ countably anticipates (anticipates, for short)
a set A ⊆ R+, if every A-martingale is dominated by a countable set of
B-martingales. If A anticipates B and B anticipates A, we say that A and
B are (weakly) equivalent. If B does not anticipate A we say that A evades
B.
Note that both “singly anticipates” and “anticipates” are reflexive and
transitive relations (namely, they are preorders),4 and that single anticipation
implies anticipation. Also, if A ⊆ B then B singly anticipates A.
Remark 1. The motivation for the definition of countable anticipation comes
from the study of algorithmic randomness (see, e.g., Downey and Riemann
(2007)), where it is natural to consider the countable set of allB-martingales
that are computable relative to M (see Peretz (2013)). Formally, a set
B ⊆ R+ effectively anticipates a set A ⊆ R+, if for every A-martingale
M and every sequence X ∈ succ(M), there is a B-martingale, computable
relative to M , that succeeds on X . More generally, one could define in
the same fashion a “C-anticipation” relation with respect to any complexity
class C. Our main focus will be on countable anticipation, and specifi-
cally on sets A and B such that B does not countably anticipate A; and
therefore B does not C-anticipate A for any complexity class C. When we
present cases in which anticipation does hold, the dominating martingales
will usually be fairly simple relative to the dominated martingales. We do
not presume to rigorously address the computational complexity of those
reductions, though.
4The evasion relation is anti-reflexive and is not transitive.
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The topological closure of a set A ⊆ R+ is denoted A¯. The following
lemma says that we can restrict our attention to closed subsets of R+.
Lemma 3. Every subset of R+ is strongly equivalent to its closure.
Proof. Let A ⊂ R+ and let M be an A¯-martingale. Define an A-martingale
S by
S(ε) = M(ε) + 2,
S ′(σ) ∈ A ∩ (M ′(σ)− 2−|σ|,M ′(σ) + 2−|σ|),
where |σ| is the length of σ. Clearly, S(σ) > M(σ), for every σ ∈ {h, t}∗;
therefore succ(S) = succ(M). 
Another simple observation is that for every A ⊆ R+ and r > 0, A is
strongly equivalent to rA := {ra : a ∈ A}. This observation leads to the
next definition.
Definition 4. Let A,B ⊆ R+. We say that A and B are proportional, if
there exists r > 0 such that rA = B. If we only require that rA ⊆ B¯, then
A is proportional to a subset of the closure of B. In that case we say that A
scales into B.
From the above and the fact that A ⊆ B implies that B singly anticipates
A, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If A scales into B, then B anticipates A, for every A,B ⊆ R+.
The next two theorems provide conditions under which the converse of
Lemma 5 also holds.
Theorem 6. For every A,B ⊆ R+, if supA <∞ and 0 6∈ B \ {0}, then B
anticipates A only if A scales into B.
Theorem 7. For every A,B ⊆ R+, if B is well ordered, namely, ∀x ∈
R+ x 6∈ B \ [0, x], then B anticipates A only if A scales into B.
Chalcraft et al. (2012) studied effective anticipation between finite sub-
sets of R. They showed that (effective) anticipation is equivalent to con-
taining a proportional set on the domain of finite sets. They further asked
whether their result extends to infinite sets. In particular, they asked if Z+
anticipates the set V = {0} ∪ [1,∞). Peretz (2013) showed that the set
{1 + 1
n
}∞n=1 ⊂ V evades (i.e., is not anticipated by) Z+, and the set { 1n}∞n=1
evades V . All of the above results follow immediately from Theorem 6.
Furthermore, any set that contains two Q-linearly independent numbers
(e.g., {1, π}) evades Z+.
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In light of Lemma 3, one may rephrase the above question of Chalcraft et al.
(2012) and ask whether, for infinite sets, anticipation is equivalent to scal-
ing. The answer is still negative (Theorem 8), although Theorems 6 and 7
above gave some conditions under which the equivalence does hold.
Theorem 7 says that if, for example, A = Z+ and B is a subset of Z+
whose density is zero, then A evades B. This is because B is well ordered,
and A does not scale into B (by the zero density). Another example is when
B is the set of all odd integers where, again, A evades B. Note that the set of
even integers is proportional to Z+ and hence is equivalent to Z+. Therefore
the even integers evade the odd integers, but not vice versa.
Furthermore, we can take any subset of Z+ that does not contain an
“ideal” (i.e., all the integer multiples of some number, namely, a set pro-
portional to Z+). If B is of the form B = Z+ \ {n · φ(n)}∞n=1 for some
function φ : N → N, then Z+ evades B even when, for example, the func-
tion φ grows very rapidly. In particular, the density of B could equal one.
The previous theorems gave some necessary conditions for anticipation.
The next theorem gives a sufficient condition.
Theorem 8. Let A,B ⊂ R+ . For x > 0, let
P (x) = {t ≥ 0 : t · (A ∩ [0, x]) ⊆ B¯ ∪ {0} }.
For any M ≥ 0 let qM (x) = max(P (x) ∩ [0,M ]). If for some M ,∫∞
0
qM (x)dx =∞, then B singly anticipates A.
This is equivalent to the following seemingly stronger theorem.
Theorem 8∗. Let A,B ⊂ R+. Suppose there is a non-increasing function
f : R+ → R+, such that
(1) B¯ ⊃ f(x) (A ∩ [0, x]), for every x ∈ R+; and
(2) ∫∞
0
f(x) dx = ∞.
Then, B singly anticipates A.
Proof of Theorem 8∗. Let M be an A-martingale. By Lemma 3 we may
assume that B is closed. Define a B-martingale, S, by
S(ε) = f(0)M(ε),
S ′(σ) = f(M(σ))M ′(σ).
Let X ∈ {h, t}N such that X ∈ succ(M), and let n ∈ N. Since f is
non-increasing,
(1) S(X ↾ n + 1)− S(X ↾ n) ≥
∫ M(X↾n+1)
M(X↾n)
f(x) dx.
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FIGURE 1. Inequality (1)
It follows by induction that
S(X ↾ n) ≥
∫ M(X↾n)
0
f(x) dx,
which concludes the proof, since M(X ↾ n) → ∞ and
∫∞
0
f(x) dx =
∞. 
If, for example, A scales into B, namely, rA ⊆ B¯, the function f in
Theorem 8∗ can be taken to be simply f(x) = r. Also note that when A
and B are finite, such a function f as in the theorem exists if and only if A
scales into B.
The theorem tells us, for example, that although R+ does not scale into
the interval [0, 1], these two sets are (strongly) equivalent: to see that [0, 1]
singly anticipates R+, apply Theorem 8∗ with f(x) = min{ 1x , 1}.
Another example is the set A = {2n}+∞n=−∞ being (strongly) equivalent
to B = {2n}0n=−∞, although A does not scale into B. To see this, apply
Theorem 8∗ with f(x) = min{1/2⌊log2 x⌋, 1}.
We previously saw, by Theorem 7, that A = Z+ evades B = Z+ \
{n · φ(n)}∞n=1. Now look at this example in the context of Theorem 8, to
see that there is no contradiction. Suppose φ(n) is increasing, and φ(n) →
∞. Then for any x > 0, the set P (x) in the theorem is unbounded, i.e.,
supP (x) = ∞. Nevertheless, fix any choice of M , and note that for every
x large enough, P (x) does not contain any nonzero number smaller than
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M , i.e., P (x) ∩ [0,M ] = {0}. Thus, for any choice of M , qM(x) = 0 for
every x large enough. In particular,
∫∞
0
qM(x)dx <∞.
3. PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Throughout this section A,B ⊂ R+ are two sets satisfying
supA <∞,
0 6∈ B \ {0},
A does not scale into B.
We must show A (countably) evades B.
Since A does not scale into B, one thing that B-martingales cannot do
in general is to mimic A-martingales, not even up to a constant ratio. We
use this idea in order to construct a sequence of heads and tails that will
separate between the two types of martingales.
3.1. Ratio minimization. LetN andM be martingales withN non-negative.
We say that x ∈ {h, t} is the N/M-ratio-minimizing outcome at σ ∈
{h, t}<∞ (assuming M(σ) > 0) if either
(1) N(σ)
M(σ)
> N(σx)
M(σx)
, or
(2) N(σ)
M(σ)
= N(σx)
M(σx)
and M(σx) > M(σ), or
(3) M ′(σ) = N ′(σ) = 0 and x = h.
In words: our first priority is to make the ratio N/M decrease; if this is
impossible (i.e., the increments of N and M are proportional to their value
at σ, and so N/M doesn’t change), then we want M to increase so as to
insure that M(σx) > 0; if that is impossible as well (i.e., both increments
are 0), we set x to be h, for completeness of definition only.
Our definition extends to finite/infinite extensions of σ by saying that
X is the length |X| (possibly |X| = ∞) N/M-ratio-minimizing extension
of σ, if Xt+1 is the N/M-ratio-minimizing outcome at X ↾ t, for every
|σ| ≤ t < |X|.
For any such N , M , and σ the infinite N/M-ratio-minimizing extension
of σ, X , makes the ratio N(X ↾ t)/M(X ↾ t) monotonically converging
to a limit L ∈ R+, as t → ∞. The next lemma will help us argue that the
ratio between the increments N ′(X ↾ t)/M ′(X ↾ t) also converges to L in
a certain sense.
Lemma 9 (Discrete l’Hoˆpital rule). Let (an)∞n=1 and (bn)∞n=1 be sequences
of real numbers. Assume that an > 0, for every n. If bn/an monotonically
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converges to a limit L ∈ R, and sup{ 1
n
∑n
k=1 |ak+1 − ak|} <∞, then
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
|(bk+1 − bk)− L(ak+1 − ak)| = 0.
Proof. Since 1
n
∑n
k=1 |ak+1−ak| is bounded, 1n
∑n
k=1(ak+1−ak) is bounded,
too; therefore
(2) lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
(bk+1 − bk)− L(ak+1 − ak) = 0.
It remains to prove that
(3) lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
[b′k − La
′
k]+ = 0,
where a′k = ak+1 − ak and similarly b′k = bk+1 − bk.
We may assume w.l.o.g. that bn
an
ց L (otherwise consider the sequence
(−bn)
∞
n=1). Namely, bkak ≥
bk+1
ak+1
, which implies that b′k ≤
bk
ak
a′k; hence
[b′k − La
′
k]+ ≤
[(
bk
ak
− L
)
a′k
]
+
≤
(
bk
ak
− L
)
|a′k|.
Now (3) follows since bk
ak
converges to L and 1
n
∑n
k=1 |a
′
k| is bounded. 
Corollary 10. Let M and N be a pair of martingales and σ ∈ {h, t}∗.
Assume that N is non-negative, M(σ) > 0, and M ′ is bounded.5 Let X be
the infinite N/M-ratio-minimizing extension of σ and L = lim
t→∞
N(X↾t)
M(X↾t)
. For
every ǫ > 0 the set
{t : |N ′(X ↾ t)− L ·M ′(X ↾ t)| > ǫ}
has zero density.
Proof. Note that
|N ′(X ↾ t)− L ·M ′(X ↾ t)| =
|(N(X ↾ t+ 1)−N(X ↾ t))− L · (N(X ↾ t+ 1)−N(X ↾ t))| .
By Lemma 9, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
|N ′(X ↾ t)− L ·M ′(X ↾ t)| = 0,
5The assumption that M ′ is bounded can be relaxed by assuming only that
1
N
∑
N−1
t=0
|M ′(X ↾ t)| is bounded.
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which implies that the density of the set
{t : |N ′(X ↾ t)− L ·M ′(X ↾ t)| > ǫ}
is zero, for every ǫ > 0. 
The next step is to construct the history-independent A-martingale pre-
scribed by Theorem 6. We formalize the properties of this martingale in the
following lemma.
Lemma 11. LetA,B ⊂ R+. Suppose that supA <∞ andA does not scale
into B; then there exists a history-independent A-martingale with positive
initial value, M , such that for every non-negative B-martingale, N , and
every σ ∈ {h, t}∗ such that M(σ) > 0, the infinite N/M-ratio-minimizing
extension of σ, X , satisfies
lim
t→∞
N(X ↾ t)
M(X ↾ t)
= 0.
Note that the A-martingale, M , does not depend on N or σ, so the same
M can be used against any N at any σ that leaves M(σ) positive.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let {an}∞n=0 be a countable dense subset of A \ {0}.
For every positive integer t, let n(t) ∈ Z+ be the largest integer such that
2n(t) divides t. Define xt := an(t). The sequence {xt}∞t=1 has the property
that the set
(4) {t : |xt − a| < ǫ}
has positive density, for every ǫ > 0 and a ∈ A.
Let M be a history-independent martingale whose increment at time t
is xt, for every t ∈ Z+ (with an arbitrary positive initial value). Let N
be an arbitrary non-negative B-martingale. Suppose that M(σ) > 0 and
let X be the infinite N/M-ratio-minimizing extension of σ and let L =
limt→∞
N(X↾t)
M(↾t)
. Corollary 10 and (4) guarantee that L · A ⊂ B¯. By the
assumption that A does not scale into B, we conclude that L = 0. 
3.2. The casino sequence. In the rest of this section we assume that supA =
inf(B \ {0}) = 1. This is w.l.o.g. since proportional sets are (strongly)
equivalent.
We begin with an informal description of the casino sequence. Lemma 11
provides a history-independent A-martingale, M , that can be used against
any B-martingale.
Given a sequence of B-martingales, N1, N2, . . ., we start off by ratio-
minimizing against N1. When M becomes greater than N1, we proceed to
the next stage. We want to make sure that N1 no longer makes any gains.
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This is done by playing adversarial to N1 whenever he wagers a positive
amount.
At times when N1 wagers nothing (i.e., N ′1 = 0), we are free to choose
either h or t without risking our primary goal. At those times we turn to
ratio-minimizing against N2, while always considering the goal of keeping
N1 from making gains a higher priority. Since inf {B \ {0}} = 1 > 0, it
is guaranteed that at some point we will no longer need to concern N1, and
hence, at some even further point, M will become greater than N1 +N2.
The process continues recursively, where at each stage our highest prior-
ity is to prevent N1 from making gains, then N2, N3, and so on until Nk;
and if none of N1, . . . , Nk wagers any positive amount, we ratio-minimize
against Nk+1.
When a positive wager of some Ni, i ∈ {1, . . . k}, is answered with
an adversarial outcome, a new index k′ must be calculated, so that M is
sufficient to keep N1, . . . , Nk′ from making gains. That is, M > N1+ · · ·+
Nk′ .
An inductive argument shows that for every fixed k, there is a point in
time beyond which none of N1, . . . , Nk will ever wager a positive amount;
therefore, at some even further point, M becomes greater than N1 + · · · +
Nk+1; hence the inductive step.
The above explains how the value of each Ni converges to someLi ∈ R+,
and the limit inferior of the value of M is at least
∑∞
i=1 Li. In order to make
sure that M goes to infinity we include, among the Nis, infinitely many
martingales of constant value 1.
We turn now to a formal description. As mentioned above, we assume
without loss of generality that supA = inf{B \ {0}} = 1. We additionally
assume that 0 ∈ B, and so we can convert arbitrary B-martingales to non-
negative ones by making them stop betting at the moment they go bankrupt.
Let M be a history-independent A-martingale provided by Lemma 11.
LetN1, N2, . . . be a sequence of non-negativeB-martingales. Assume with-
out loss of generality that infinitely many of the Nis are the constant 1 mar-
tingale.
We define a sequence X ∈ {h, t}∞ recursively. Assume X ↾ t is already
defined.
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First we introduce some notation. Denote the value of M at time t by
m(t) = M(X ↾ t), and similarly ni(t) = Ni(X ↾ t), for every i ∈ N. Let
Si(t) =
i∑
j=1
nj(t),
k(t) = max{i : Si(t) < m(t)}, and
S(t) = Sk(t)(t).
Note that the maximum is well defined, since the ni(t) include infinitely
many 1s.
We are now ready to define Xt+1. We distinguish between two cases:
Case I: there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ k(t) such that N ′j(X ↾ t) 6= 0; Case II:
N ′1(X ↾ t) = · · · = N
′
k(t)(X ↾ t) = 0.
In Case I, let i = min{j : N ′j(X ↾ t) 6= 0} and define
Xt+1 =
{
t if N ′i(X ↾ t) > 0,
h if N ′i(X ↾ t) < 0.
In Case II, Xt+1 is the
Nk(t)+1
M−S(t)
-ratio-minimizing outcome at X ↾ t. Ex-
plicitly,
Xt+1 =

t if
N ′
k(t)+1
(X↾t)
M ′(X↾t)
>
nk(t)+1
m(t)−S(t)
,
h if
N ′
k(t)+1
(X↾t)
M ′(X↾t)
≤
nk(t)+1
m(t)−S(t)
.
Consider the tuple α(t) = (⌊n1(t)⌋, . . . , ⌊nk(t)(t)⌋). In Case I, α(t + 1)
is strictly less that α(t) according to the lexicographic order. In Case II,
α(t) is a prefix of α(t + 1), and so under a convention in which a prefix of
a tuple is greater than that tuple, we have that {α(t)}∞t=1 is a non-increasing
sequence.6 Let k = lim inf
t→∞
k(t). It follows that from some point in time,
α consists of at least k elements; therefore the first k elements of α must
stabilize at some further point in time. Namely, for t large enough we have
⌊ni(t)⌋ = lim
t′→∞
⌊ni(t′)⌋ <∞, for every i ≤ k. Since the increments of ni(t)
are bounded below by 1, n1(t), . . . , nk(t) stabilize, too. Also, since m(t) >
S(t), we have lim inf
t→∞
m(t) ≥ limt→∞ Si(t), for every i ≤ lim inf
t→∞
k(t).
Since there are infinitely many i’s for which ni(t) is constantly 1, the proof
of Theorem 6 is concluded by showing that lim inf
t→∞
k(t) = ∞.
6Alternatively, one can use the standard lexicographic order where α(t) is appended
with an infinite sequence of ∞ elements.
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Assume by negation that lim inf
t→∞
k(t) = k < ∞. There is a time T0 such
that nk(t) = lim
t′→∞
nk(t
′) and k(t) ≥ k, for every t > T0. There cannot be
a t > T0, for which k(t) > k and k(t + 1) = k. That would mean a Case
I transition from time t to t + 1 and we would have ni(t + 1) < ni(t), for
some i ≤ k. It follows that k(t) = k, for every t > T0.
From time T0 ratio-minimization against nk+1 takes place. Let l =
lim inf
t→∞
nk+1(t). If l = 0, then nk+1(t) < 1, for some t > T0; at this point
nk+1 stabilizes (otherwiseNk+1 would go bankrupt); therefore nk+1(t) = 0;
therefore k(t) > k, which is not possible. If l > 0, then by Lemma 11,
there must be some time t > T0 in which m(t) > nk+1(t) + Sk(T0) =
nk+1(t) + S(t), which contradicts the definition of S(t).
4. PROOF OF THEOREM 7
To show that if B is well ordered and A does not scale into B, then A
evades B, we construct an A-martingale M , s.t. for any B-martingales
N1, N2, . . . we construct a sequence X on which M succeeds, while every
Ni does not.
We begin with a rough outline of the proof ideas. M always bets on
“heads.” Before tackling every Ni, we first gain some money and “put it
aside.” Then we ratio-minimize against Ni. It will eventually make M suf-
ficiently richer than Ni, so that we can declare Ni to be “fragile” now. This
means that from now on the casino can make Ni lose whenever it is “active”
(i.e., makes a non-zero bet), since M can afford losses until Ni is bankrupt.
When Ni is not active, we can start tackling Ni+1, while constantly making
sure that we have enough money kept aside for containing the fragile oppo-
nents. An important point is to show that once some Ni becomes fragile, it
remains fragile unless a lower-index martingale becomes active.
Let (an) be a sequence that is dense within A \ {0}, and such that each
number in the sequence appears infinitely many times. For example, given
a dense sequence (xn) in A \ {0}, the sequence
x1; x1, x2; x1, x2, x3; x1, x2, x3, x4; . . .
can be used.
Since multiplying A or B by a positive constant does not make a differ-
ence, we may assume w.l.o.g. that a1 = 1, and that inf(B \ {0}) = 1 (B is
well ordered; hence in particular B \ {0} is bounded away from 0).
We construct M and X as follows. Denote m(t) = M(X ↾ t), and
similarly m′(t) = M ′(X ↾ t). Take integers
f(t, k) ≥ max{m(t), |(ak+1 − ak)/ak|}.
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FIGURE 2. γ and the wagers
We take M(ε) = a1. For the first f(0, 1) stages, M ′ = a1. Then, after
stage t = f(0, 1), M ′ = a2 for the next f(t, 2) periods, and after stage
t′ = t + f(t, 2), M ′ = a3 for f(t′, 3) stages, and so on. But this goes on
only as long as no “tails” appears. Whenever a “tails” appears, namely, at
a stage t where Xt = t, we revert to playing from the beginning of the
sequence, i.e., M ′ = a1 for the next f(t, 1) stages (or until another “tails”
appears), then M ′ = a2, etc.
For t ≥ 0 we define the function γ(t), which is similar to m′(t), but
modifies sudden increases of m′ into more gradual ones. At the beginning
of a block of stages where ak is wagered (i.e., where m′(·) = ak), γ equals
ak. If ak+1 ≤ ak, then γ remains ak throughout this block. Otherwise, it
linearly increases until reaching ak+1 exactly at the beginning of the next
block. I.e., suppose m′(t) = ak, and let s ≤ t be the beginning of the block
(of length f(s, k)) of ak wagers. If ak+1 ≤ ak then γ(t) = ak. Otherwise,
γ(t) =
(s+ f(s, k)− t) ak + (t− s)ak+1
f(s, k)
.
Note: (i) γ(t) ≥ m′(t),
(ii) If Xt+1 = t then γ(t+ 1) = a1 = 1,
(iii) If Xt+1 = h then γ(t+ 1)− γ(t) ≤ m′(t).
The last one follows fromm′(t) = ak, γ(t+1)−γ(t) ≤ (ak+1−ak)/f(s, k),
and f(s, k) ≥ |(ak+1 − ak)/ak| , by the definition of f .
Let N1, N2, . . . be B-martingales (and assume these martingales never
bet on money that they do not have). Denote ni(t) = Ni(X ↾ t). To define
the sequence X , denote νk(t) = k+n1(t)+. . .+nk(t), and let p = p(t) ≥ 0
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be the largest integer such that
m(t)− (γ(t)− 1) > νp(t).
N1, . . . , Np(t) are the “fragile” martingales at time t. Define
µ(t) = m(t)− (νp(t) + 1)
and consider two cases. (i) If there exists some index 1 ≤ j ≤ p(t) s.t.
n′j(t) 6= 0, let i be the smallest such index, and Xt+1 is chosen adversely
to n′i. (ii) Otherwise, Xt+1 is chosen by µ/Np+1-ratio-minimizing, i.e., if
µ(t) > 0 and n′p+1(t)/m′(t) > np+1(t)/µ(t) then Xt+1 = t, and otherwise
Xt+1 = h .
We now show that these M and X indeed work.
Lemma 12. For any t, if p(t) ≥ i and n′j(t) = 0 for every j < i, then
p(t+ 1) ≥ i .
Proof of Lemma 12. We prove the following equivalent claim:
(I) If i ≤ p(t) is the smallest index such that n′i(t) 6= 0, then i ≤ p(t + 1).
(II) If n′j(t) = 0 for any j ≤ p(t), then p(t) ≤ p(t+ 1).
In case (II), denote i = p(t). Then in both cases
m(t)− (γ(t)− 1) > νi(t)
is known. Let L(t) designate the LHS of this inequality. We need to show
that L(t + 1) > νi(t + 1). Note that for any j < i, nj(t + 1) = nj(t), and
that if Xt+1 = h then L(t+1) ≥ L(t), since m(t+1) = m(t) +m′(t) and
γ(t+ 1) ≤ γ(t) +m′(t).
(I) In this case the casino makes i lose, hence ni(t+1) ≤ ni(t)−1 (recall
that inf(B \ {0}) = 1); therefore νi(t+1) ≤ νi(t)− 1. If Xt+1 = h we are
done. IfXt+1 = t thenm(t+1) = m(t)−m′(t), and γ(t+1) = 1; therefore,
L(t+1) = L(t)−m′(t)+(γ(t)−1) ≥ L(t)−γ(t)+(γ(t)−1) = L(t)−1.
(II) In this case ni(t + 1) = ni(t); hence νi(t + 1) = νi(t). If Xt+1 = h
we are done. If Xt+1 = t then m(t+ 1) = m(t)−m′(t) and γ(t+ 1) = 1.
But Xt+1 = t also implies (by the definition of X) that µ(t) > 0 and
n′i+1(t)/m
′(t) > ni+1(t)/µ(t). Since n′i+1(t) is always ≤ ni+1(t), we get
that µ(t) > m′(t). Now, L(t + 1) = (m(t) −m′(t)) − (1 − 1) = m(t) −
m′(t) > m(t)−µ(t) = νi(t)+1, because µ(t) is m(t)− (νi(t)+1). Thus,
L(t+ 1) > νi(t) + 1 > νi(t) = νi(t + 1). 
Remark: The above argument also proves that M is never bankrupt, i.e.,
m(t) ≥ m′(t), and moreover m(t) ≥ γ(t), as follows.
In the beginning 1 = m(0) ≥ γ(0) = 1. As long as p(t) = 0 we are
in case (II). In this case, if Xt+1 = h then L(t) does not decrease; hence
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m(t) − γ(t) does not decrease. And if Xt+1 = t we just saw that actually
L(t+ 1) > 1 + νi(t+ 1), which implies that m(t)− γ(t) > 0.
Once p(t) > 0, then νi(t) ≥ 1, hence L(t) > νi(t) implies that m(t) −
γ(t) > 0; and Lemma 12 implies that p(t) remains > 0.
Lemma 13. For any i there exists a stage Ti s.t. for any t > Ti , n′1(t) =
n′2(t) = . . . = n
′
i(t) = 0, and p(t) ≥ i.
Proof of Lemma 13. We proceed by induction over i ≥ 0; namely, the in-
duction hypothesis is that the lemma holds for i−1. Note that the induction
base case i = 0 holds vacuously.7
If p(t0) ≥ i for some stage t0 > Ti−1, then p(t) ≥ i for every t ≥ t0, by
lemma 12. From this stage on, the casino chooses adversely to i whenever
i is active (because the lower-index players are not active). Therefore, i
will be active at no more than ni(t0) stages after t0, since afterwards i has
nothing to wager, and we are done.
So assume by way of contradiction that p(t) = i− 1 for every t > Ti−1 .
Then Xt+1 is µ/Ni-ratio-minimizing. As long as µ(t) ≤ 0 we get “heads”;
therefore, from some stage on, µ > 0 (as every ak appears infinitely many
times, the sum of the wagers will not converge). Denote q(t) = ni(t)/µ(t).
q(t) ≥ 0 is non-increasing and therefore converges to a limit L. Denote
0 ≤ r(t) = ni(t)− Lµ(t).
Suppose there exists some k s.t. the wagers m′(t) never reach beyond
a1, . . . , ak . Hence, there are infinitely many stages t where i over-bets, i.e.,
n′i(t) > q(t)m
′(t). For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, let xj = Laj . Since B is well ordered,
there exists some δj > 0 s.t. (xj , xj + δj) ∩ B = ∅ . Since q(t) → L ,
q(t) < L+min1≤j≤k(δj/aj) for t large enough.
When i over-bets and m′(t) = aj , then r(t+1) = ni(t+1)−Lµ(t+1) ≤
ni(t) − (Laj + δj) − L(µ(t) − aj) = r(t) − δj . When i does not over-
bet, then n′i(t) ≤ xj = Laj , and r(t + 1) = ni(t + 1) − Lµ(t + 1) ≤
(ni(t) +Laj)−L(µ(t) + aj) = r(t). Therefore r(t) does not increase, and
infinitely many times it decreases by at least δ = min1≤j≤k δj > 0; hence
eventually r(t) < 0, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, there does not exist an index k as above. This implies that
for any j, there is a stage t after which aj is wagered f(t, j) consecutive
times, and Ni does not over-bet (otherwise aj+1 cannot be reached). Now
suppose that L > 0 . Let A0 = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of all the values that
the sequence (an) takes. A0 is dense in A, and L ·A * B¯ (since A does not
7Incidentally, the inequality defining fragility always holds for p(t) = 0, asm(t) ≥ γ(t)
and ν0(t) = 0 imply that m(t)− (γ(t)− 1) > ν0(t).
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scale into B); therefore, also L ·A0 * B¯. Hence, there exists an a ∈ A0 s.t.
the distance between La and B¯ is δ > 0.
Let ∆ = min{δ/a, δ}. For t larger than some T∆, q(t) < L+∆. Since
a appears infinitely many times in the sequence (an), there exist Ta > T∆
and an index j, s.t. aj = a is wagered f(Ta, j) consecutive times, and at
each of these times n′i(t) ≤ La − δ, as otherwise n′i(t) ≥ La + δ, but that
is over-betting since (La + δ)/a = L + δ/a > q(t). Hence, r(t + 1) ≤
ni(t) + La − δ − L(µ(t) + a) = r(t) − δ. But q(Ta) < L + δ; therefore
ni(Ta) < (L + δ)µ(Ta); hence r(Ta) < δµ(Ta). By the definition of f ,
f(Ta, j) ≥ m(Ta) ≥ µ(Ta); therefore after those f(Ta, j) times, r < 0 .
This cannot be; therefore L = 0.
As q(t) → 0, surely q(t) < 1 for large enough t, namely, µ(t) > ni(t).
Since µ(t) = m(t) − (νi−1(t) + 1), we get m(t) > ni(t) + νi−1(t) + 1 =
ni(t)+((i−1)+n1(t)+ . . .+ni−1(t))+1 = i+n1(t)+ . . .+ni(t) = νi(t).
At some stage t, M starts wagering 1. For this t, γ(t) = m′(t) = 1; hence
m(t) − (γ(t) − 1) = m(t) > νi(t), contradicting our assumption that i is
not fragile. 
Lemma 13 states that any Ni is only active a finite number of times,
and therefore it is bounded; it also states that for any i and large enough t,
m(t)− (γ(t)− 1) > νi(t), hence m(t) > νi(t) + (γ(t)− 1) > νi(t)− 1 ≥
i− 1, and therefore m(t) →∞.
5. EXTENSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
5.1. Extensions. The definition of anticipation corresponds to the game
where gambler 0 first announces her A-martingale, then the regular gam-
blers announce theirB-martingales, and then the casino chooses a sequence.
Thus, the regular gamblers know the future actions of gambler 0, the casino
knows the future actions of all gamblers, and gambler 0 does not even ob-
serve the past bets of other gamblers.
Our proofs, however, do not rely on this state of affairs. One may con-
sider variants of this game in which the casino does not know the future
actions, or the regular gamblers do not know the future actions of gambler
0, or gambler 0 does observe the bets of others; or any combination thereof.
Our results hold for all these variants.
One of these variants looks more like a “classic” repeated game: at each
stage of the game, first gambler 0 makes a bet, then the regular gamblers
make bets, and then the casino chooses red or black (and everything is ob-
served by all).
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Another generalization is that the set B need not be the same for all regu-
lar gamblers. That is, the results still apply for sets B1, B2, B3 . . . of wagers
for gamblers 1, 2, 3 . . ., if the conditions hold for each Bi separately (of
course, the conditions may not hold for their union).
Bienvenu et al. (2012) consider the case of computable martingales, with
A being the set of all integers, and Bi finite sets of integers. They use a
probabilistic argument to show evasion. Our proof provides, in particular, a
construction of the casino sequence for this case. The constructed sequence
is computable relative to the history of bets.
5.2. Further Research. It seems possible that our proof of Theorem 7
could be modified so as to avoid the assumption that B is well ordered. We
conjecture that Theorems 6 and 7 can be unified as the following statement.
Conjecture 14. Let A,B ⊂ R+. If 0 6∈ B \ {0}, then B anticipates A only
if A scales into B.
The present paper strove to understand the effect of restricting the wager
sets on the prediction power of martingales. As is often the case, under-
standing one thing brings up many new questions. We list just a few.
• Under the assumptions of Theorem 6, A can evade B through a
history-independent martingale. Is this also the case under the as-
sumptions of Theorem 7?
• Are single anticipation and countable anticipation different? That
is, are there sets A,B ⊂ R+, such that B countably, but not singly,
anticipates A?
• What can be said about the anticipation relation between sets that do
include 0 as an accumulation point, for example, {2−n}∞n=1, { 1n}
∞
n=1,
and R+?
• Buss and Minnes (2013) introduced martingales defined by proba-
bilistic strategies. How do these martingales behave in our frame-
work?
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